This paper explores trends in inequality and poverty using both market and after-tax and transfer income in the period during and after the Great Recession (through 2011). Using market income (or wages), inequality and poverty rose sharply between 2008 and 2010. The primary exception is measures for the top of the distribution; annual wage and income shares of the top one percent dipped in 2008 and 2009. Including taxes and transfers, broad-based inequality measures also fell, and the poverty increase was muted. Tax and transfer policies lowered inequality and poverty, but those policies were not equal across the population. Poverty declined among the elderly, changed little among children, and rose sharply among the working-age. Inequality fell across the total population, but was unchanged among working-age households. Since 2009, as the economy has grown slowly, inequality has risen for all groups, and poverty remains high for the working-age.
Introduction
The Great Recession (GR) was the most dramatic economic downturn the US has experienced since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Tumbling stock and housing markets erased more than $15 trillion in national wealth in 2008, or nearly 10 per cent of real total national financial assets. As financial markets and the rest of the economy slowed to a halt, The crisis brought about substantial economic policy response. In addition to the 'automatic stabilizers' built into Unemployment Insurance, SNAP, and the tax system, there were several major policy changes that pumped hundreds of billions of dollars into the economy in 2009 and 2010 (Burtless, 2009 ). The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) helped stabilize the financial sector, using more the $400 billion to purchase or insure troubled assets, taking major stakes in General Motors, AIG, and Citigroup. The American The powerful economic shocks in 2008 and 2009, the policy response to the Great Recession, and the ensuing period of slow growth all impacted household incomes. This paper evaluates the combined distributional impacts of those changes. US Inequality had risen in the decades leading up to the Great Recession, and this paper explores whether the recession or the expansion have interrupted or had any differential impact on those long-term trends (Thompson and Smeeding, 2013) . It covers the impacts of the GR on household income inequality and poverty, primarily using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). We also explore the degree to which the tax and transfer system mitigated these impacts in the GR, and analyze changes in the composition of income between earnings, capital, and transfers.
In the paper we show that changes in inequality and poverty during the Great Recession depend, to a great extent, on the population being considered and whether taxes and transfers are included in the definition of income. Using either market income or the Census Bureau's "Money Income," which includes some transfer income but does not net out taxes paid, inequality and poverty both rose substantially for all households combined.
Between 2007 and 2009 the poverty rate among all people rose 15 percent under both the official definition, which uses Money Income, and market income. The distribution of household income also grew more unequal; the P90/P10 ratio rose 6 percent using Money Income" and 21 percent using equivalized market income, the Gini coefficient rose 1.1 percentage points using money income and 4 percentage points using equivalized market income. The distribution of workers' hourly wages also rose sharply, with the P90/P10 ratio and the Gini coefficient hitting record highs in 2009 and 2010.
Including taxes and a broader range of transfers than what is included in "Money
Income" to create a measure of "Disposable Household Income" (DHI) suggests a different picture for poverty and inequality during the Great Recession. Between 2007 and transfer payments rose and taxes fell; the economic stimulus measures that helped halt the economy's decline in 2009 also softened the recession's distributional impacts. After adjusting for taxes, transfers, and household size, the Gini Index and the P90/P10 and P90/P50 ratios each declined modestly between 2007 and 2009. The increase in poverty was also blunted, rising only three percentage points (for individuals, using the experimental poverty thresholds and income measures recommended by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)), compared to six percentage points using market income.
For the total population, taxes and transfers played an important role in offsetting increases in poverty and inequality that would have otherwise occurred during the Great Recession. The extent of that offset, however, varied across different group. In particular, policies appear to have been very successful at shielding and augmenting the incomes of the elderly, but not as successful for the working-age population. Between 2007 and 2009, poverty rates rose 15 percent among working-age individuals, three percent among children, and fell five percent among the elderly. Instead of falling, as it did among the total population, income inequality was unchanged between 2007 and 2009 when measured among working-age households.
After 2009, however, as a slow-growing recovery took hold and the temporary economic stimulus measures began to phase out, inequality started growing again, regardless of the definition of income used or the age group considered. The P90/P10 ratio of equivalized DHI rose 4.5 percent for all househods, and 8.8 percent for non-elderly households between 2009 and 2011; the Gini coefficient rose 3.0 and 3.7 percent, respectively.
Recent increases in inequality based on percentile ratios and Gini coefficients using CPS data are also largely consistent with the recovery of high-income and high-wage shares using administrative data sources. The long-term rise in the share of wages and incomes received by the top few percent of the distribution was halted temporarily during the great recession, but rose again in 2010 and 2011. The top one percent share of annual wages, based on analysis of Social Security Administration earnings records, dipped from 14 percent in 2007 to 12.1 percent in 2009, but had rebounded to 13.1 percent by 2011 (Mishel and Finio, 2013) . The top one percent share of income, based on analysis of IRS tax return statistics, dipped from 21.5 percent in 2007 to 17.5 percent in 2009, but had rebounded to 18.8 percent by 2011 (Saez, 2013) . Despite declines during the GR, top wage and income shares remain at historically very high levels, more than twice levels from thirty years earlier. The rapid recovery of corporate profits and the US stock market, both at all-time highs by mid-2013, suggest further improvements will follow for the top end of the income distribution.
At the other end of the distribution, poverty has remained at high levels since the official end of the Great Recession, particularly among the working-age. By 2011 the official poverty rate for households had risen to the same high rates seen in the economic downturns of the early 1980s and early 1990s. Among individuals between 25 and 64, after-tax and transfer poverty rates in 2011 were essentially unchanged from levels reached in 2009, while rates have declined among children and the elderly. A more comprehensive poverty measure -based on the US National Academy of Sciences recommendations -finds largely the same trend, though in-kind benefits and refundable tax credit helped mute the effect of the GR on poverty for some groups, especially families with children.
The next section describes the data and the methods used in the paper. Then we turn to discussing labor market conditions in the Great Recession and the period since. The fourth section of the paper discusses trends in income inequality, including data on top-incomes and the source-composition of household income. The fifth section discusses poverty trends, and the final section concludes.
Methods

Household income and poverty
In the analysis we use the Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS). The ASEC, or 'March CPS' as it is conducted in March of each year, is a survey of approximately 65,000 households that has been conducted annually in the United States for more than 50 years. The ASEC asks respondents to provide detailed income, family, and demographic detail for the previous calendar year.
Our analysis uses data from the surveys conducted between 1980 and 2012, covering household income for the calendar years between 1979 and 2011. Our baseline figures use the Census Bureau's 'money income.' Money income is a broad income concept, and includes earnings, social insurance benefits, public assistance transfers, pensions and other retirement income, capital income, and other forms of income. Money income does not include capital gains income or reflect personal income taxes, social security taxes, union dues, or Medicare deductions. Money income also does not include noncash benefits, such as food stamps, employer subsidized health benefits, rent-free housing, and goods produced and consumed on the farm.
1
In addition to calculating measures of inequality using money income, we also calculate measures of market income and disposable income. Market income removes public transfer payments from the census money income definition. Disposable household income starts with money income and nets out taxes, adding some transfer payments that are not included in money income. Taxes are estimated using the National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts 1993) . Using the household income and demographic data from the March CPS, TAXSIM produces state and federal income taxes, including the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), as well as FICA social insurance taxes. We further supplement the baseline Census 'money income' definition by adding estimated food stamp benefits, now referred to as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).
1 Money income also does not reflect fact that noncash benefits are also received by some nonfarm residents which often take the form of the use of business transportation and facilities, full or partial payments by business for retirement programs, medical and educational expenses, etc. The definition is discussed in the "Income Definitions Appendix". This estimate combines the CPS variables for food stamps receipt status, number of beneficiaries, and months of receipt with average monthly benefit amounts from the USDA.
When considering long-term trends in any income measure, we include adjustments for topcoding in the March CPS, using the consistent cell mean series made available by Larrimore et al. (2008) , and also account for the 1994 (Survey Year) series break by smoothing the relevant series at the break-point, similar to approach used by Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) .
Both market and disposable income measures are divided by a standard equivalence scale to account for household economies of scale (the square root of household size.) We calculate several measures of inequality, including the Gini Index and ratios of key income per centiles, such as the P90/P50 and P90/P10 ratios, and also describe the composition of income (earnings, transfers, and capital income) and how those have changed in the GR. We calculate poverty rates, based on both the official poverty thresholds determined by the US Census Bureau, and also the relative measure of poverty (60 per cent of median household income) used by the European Union. We calculate measures of poverty and inequality for the overall population, and also for different age groups and educational attainment levels.
We explore the impact of changes to tax and transfer policies on poverty with the experimental poverty data published by the Census Bureau. We use the NAS-recommended poverty thresholds, which reflect regional cost-of-living differences, median consumer expenditures, and out-of-pocket medical expenses. We compare poverty rates by age group based on market income with those calculated using the expanded after-tax and transfer income also recommended by NAS.
Top incomes/wages
One important limitation of the March CPS is that it does not adequately capture income received by those at the very top of the distribution. The CPS income data are not only 'topcoded,' but the survey itself does not include sufficient numbers of high-income households to make reliable estimates of incomes at the very top of the distribution, the top one per cent or the top one-tenth of one per cent, for example. For a thorough discussion of top-coding in the CPS and how it impacts measuring inequality at the top of the distribution, see Burkhauser et al. (2008) .
A number of other data sources can be used to assess inequality levels at the top of the distribution, including the CBO's 'comprehensive household income,' Internal Revenue Service (IRS) income tax records and the Survey of Consumer Finances. We supplement the findings from our analysis of data from the March CPS by reporting some key findings from research that has analyzed inequality trends using these top-incomes data sources (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2011, Smeeding and Thompson, 2011) . We also include discussion of related research focused on annual earnings, including papers by Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) and Mishel and Finio (2013) using earnings records from the Social Security Administration. (Each of the income sources we use are more fully described in the Appendix on income definitions.)
Unemployment, labor force participation, and hourly wages
We use the Outgoing Rotation Group files of the Current Population Survey (CPS ORG), with data covering the period from 1979 to 2011, to examine how the Great Recession and other recent recessions have impacted unemployment, labor force participation, and hourly wages. As with income inequality, we calculate Gini coefficients and ratios of key wage percentiles.
The labor market during and following the Great Recession
The labor market fallout from the Great Recession proved to be both dramatic and persistent. The overall rate of unemployment remained slightly lower than the 9.5 percent rate from 1983. Compared to that earlier downturn, long-term unemployment is considerably greater, and the rate of unemployment among most groups is actually higher than in the early 1980s.
In 2010 the unemployment rates for all major educational-attainment and age groups hit 30-year highs. Among college graduates, the unemployment rate jumped from 2. In sum, the picture is one of a state of continued labor market recession through 2011.
Both Farber (2011) and Sum et al. (2011b, c) suggest that the numbers of displaced workersthose losing their jobs -and the numbers of long term unemployed were at an all-time high in 2010. Howell and Azizoglu (2011) show that new hires and job openings were at a decade long low in 2010, while permanent job losers were at an all-time high over this same period.
The full effect of the GR on employment therefore is not known with certainty. Estimates from mid-2013 suggest that employment will not return to pre-recession employment levels until sometime between 2017 and 2020 (Looney and Greenstone, 2012, updated) . And, there is a real concern that even rapid economic growth with low unemployment will fail to produce meaningful employment gains for some segments of the workforce. The main routes to the middle class for those with lower levels of educational attainment -manufacturing and construction -have narrowed and are essentially closed , Glaeser 2010 ). There has been considerable debate over whether the causes for continued high levels of unemployment in 2010 and 2011 were primarily cyclical or structural (Rothstein, 2012; Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo, 2013) , but even a cyclical job loss that extends for 4-6 years becomes a secular issue almost by definition. Long term joblessness is very damaging to the career and life chances of all workers, especially younger workers and also negatively impacts family stability and the future of children in these households (Von Wachter 2010).
Falling wages and record high levels of wage inequality
In the face of a deep and sustained labor market downturn, real hourly wages can be expected to decline. Because so many workers have lost their jobs, however, the accompanying composition shifts in the employed workforce may potentially obscure falling wages. Trends in average real hourly wages, in fact, suggest modest growth in the downturn, but falling wages across the distribution in the early stages of a slow-growth recovery. workers found employment. Declining wages among more highly educated workers in their prime working-age years suggests that factors beyond the shifting composition of the employed may be at play in driving trends in wage inequality. Table 1 illustrates the wage growth during the downturn and the recovery period for different age and education groups. Between 2007 and 2009, downward wage pressures were most evident among younger and less educated workers, while older and more highly educated workers continued to registered wage increases (Table 1, Table A2 , panel C).
Obtaining a bachelor's degree, however, did not make workers immune from wage pressures in the GR. Young workers ( 
Income impacts of the Great Recession
Because workers are typically part of a household unit that shares resources across several members, oftentimes including multiple earners, and because households are able to draw upon non-labor sources of income, it is important to go beyond wages or earnings and Income inequality measured using the money income definition rose steadily over this period. By 2011, the Gini index and the P90/P10 and P90/P50 ratios were all between three and seven percent higher than levels seen in 2007. (Table A3 , panel A).
<Figure 5 near here>
Adjusting for taxes, transfers, and household size: Equivalized Disposable Household Income (EDHI)
In addition to the market factors driving employment losses and depressing wages, a host of actions by the public sector and individuals combined to influence household well-being during the GR and the following period. Automatic stabilizers (including Unemployment The baseline Census 'money income' definition includes some sources of transfer income (UI, TANF, and Social Security), but it does not include others (such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and SNAP, and it also excludes taxes. To reflect the influence of these transfers and taxes, we calculate a measure of net income which subtracts taxes (including federal and state income taxes and the employee share of social insurance FICA taxes) and additional transfer payments (including the EITC and SNAP benefits) from money income. To reflect household economies of scale, we then divide real net household income by the square root of the household size. The resulting measure, 'equivalised disposable household income' (EDHI), is a superior measure of household well-being, since an equivalent amount of gross money income results in a lower standard of living if family size is larger or applicable taxes are higher. This section contrasts changes in EDHI with the official income definition ('money income') and also with a measure of market income calculated by subtracting transfers from money income.
Accounting for taxes, transfers, and household size, average household income declined by only three-fifths as much -falling just 2.9 per cent between 2007 and 2011 ( Figure 5, panel B) . Non-elderly households follow the same trend, but elderly households saw their incomes rise over this period. The rise in inequality is also muted once these factors are included (Table A3, the distribution were larger and the declines at the top of the distribution were smaller. As a result, the 90/10 ratio of EDHI among non-elderly households increased nearly 9 percent, while the 90/50 ratio rose 3 percent, and the GINI index rose nearly 4 percent (Table A3, panel C). See also .
<Figure 7 near here>
The impact of taxes and transfers, and the differential impacts between elderly and non-elderly households are even more evident when we compare trends between EDHI and market income. Table 2 shows that the Gini coefficient for market income rose 3.9 percent between 2007 and 2009 for all ages of households, but the DHI Gini fell by nearly one percent. The P90/P10 ratio rose nearly 21 percent using market income, but fell almost 3 percent in EDHI. The experience among the non-elderly, though, was different, such that the Gini coefficient for EDHI rose slightly between 2007 and 2009, and the P90/P10 ratio fell only a fraction of the decline seen by all ages of households. Also shown in Table 2 is the fact that the reduction in income inequality, expressed as the difference between market and EDHI inequality, for both the Gini coefficient and the P90/P10 ratio, is systematically greater among all households than for non-elderly households.
Since 2009 the increases in inequality, using market income and EDHI, are considerably larger among the non-elderly (Figure 8 ). It appears that the phase-out of the stimulus polices, alongside sustained high levels of unemployment, and a restoration of growth in the stock market and other sources of capital incomes are fueling a return to rising inequality seen in the decades leading up to the GR.
< table 2 near here> < figure8 near here>
Shifting income composition
These comparisons of inequality trends indicated that households headed by the elderly and non-elderly have experienced different income paths though the Great Recession.
Why did the elderly do better than the non-elderly? The elderly depend more on income transfers and investment income and less on the labor market than do the non-elderly. This basic fact of the 'by-sources' income distribution is well known and has been the subject of considerable discussion in recent years. The elderly who were already retired in 2008 lost some home value along with most other owners, but were generally invested in relatively safe portfolios, which protected their assets and income flows (Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai 2010) . Older workers take up Social Security benefits at high rates once they pass age 62. The 46 per cent of elders who take up benefits between ages 52 and 65 are subject to an earnings test which discourages work in these age ranges . But those who wait until they reach their normal retirement age, 65 to 67 or more, not only receive higher benefits than at age 62, but are allowed to receive these social pensions without any penalty for earnings. Among the higher skilled elderly, employment has increased throughout the recession, owing in part to reluctance to retire and increased work after retirement. The success of the tax and transfer system in sustaining the incomes of, and mitigating inequality among, older households, and its failure to do so for non-elderly households is consistent with Ben-Shalom et al.'s (2011) assessment of US anti-poverty programs increasingly directed toward the elderly (and the disabled) and away from the young.
Analysis of the shifting sources of income, using the augmented income definition described above, confirms these prior analyses (Table 3) . Table 3 <Table3 near here>
The impact of public policy was relatively broad-based, with the transfer share of income rising and the tax share declining for nearly every quintile group (Table 3, The transfer share of income rose 4.7 per cent for non-elderly households in the bottom quintile group and 3.4 per cent of those in the middle quintile group, but less than one per cent for those in the top quintile group. Among elderly households in the bottom quintile group, though, there was no change in the transfer share of income. The transfer share of elderly households in the middle fifth rose more than 6 per cent, but it also rose more than 3 per cent among elderly households in the top fifth.
The capital income share of household income also declined in the GR across most of the distribution, for elderly and non-elderly households (Table 3, The decline in the capital income share was most notable for the top quintile group, where the capital share fell from 7.1 to 6.2 per cent for non-elderly households and from 38.3 to 32.6
per cent for elderly households.
Growth in top incomes/wages
Because of income top-coding and the presence of relatively few extremely high income households in the sample, it is not possible to use the March CPS to estimate inequality at the very top of the income distribution. In recent years a number of studies have demonstrated that much of the growth in inequality since the 1970s has been isolated to the top few percentiles of the distribution. To the extent that the top few percentiles are driving inequality, the P90/P10 ratios, and Gini indices calculated with the March CPS understate the level of inequality at any point in time and possibly the trend toward greater inequality over time. Because of differences in the income composition, it is possible that the Great Recession could have had a different effect on inequality at the very top of the distribution.
The data sources for top incomes experience an even longer lag-time than the standard household surveys, but we do have some preliminary evidence on the impact of the GR on inequality at the very top of the distribution during the GR and the period since.
Analyzing tax data from the IRS, Saez (2010) million would have an income of zero using the approach of ABL, since they assign no value 4 SCF income and MCI are both described in the Appendix.
to the stock of wealth itself. For this household, however, the remaining asset has considerable value, representing potential consumption and collateral, among others. The method of Smeeding and Thompson (2011) , and that of Wolff and Zacharias (2006) , recognizes the value of the asset stock and assigns it a return, which is diminished when the asset value falls, but does not become negative. corporations, but also pensions, rental property owners and stockholders) and less than 12 per cent to workers in the form of wages or benefits, with wage declines almost the same as employer benefit increases.
Poverty impacts of the Great Recession
As income declined, dramatically so for young and less educated households, poverty rose.
According to the official U.S. Government definition of poverty (using the Census 'money income' definition), the share of households in poverty rose to 13.4 percent in 2009, and has continued to rise since, reaching 14.3 percent in 2011, reaching the same high levels hit in previous downturns (Table A3, by also adding in the value of subsidized housing and school lunches, and energy assistance, and subtracting work-related expenses including child care. Compared to the official poverty definitions, the NAS also adjusts poverty thresholds over time not by changes in the CPI, but by changes in median expenditures on necessities and adjusts for cost-of-living differences across areas (using HUD fair market rents) as well as for out-of-pocket medical expenses.
See Short (2011 for a more thorough explanation of these new measures.
We can use the Census figures to show the impacts of taxes and transfers, by comparing poverty rates using market income and the expanded version of income recommended by the NAS. Overall the experimental (NAS) measure results in a slightly higher poverty rate in most years; the 2011 poverty rate (for individuals) was 14.9 percent using the official definition and 16.9 percent using NAS-recommended income and thresholds. ( Table 4 ). The most dramatic difference is in the age composition of poverty, though, by taking medical expenditures into account, the NAS measure results in higher poverty among older individuals and lower poverty among younger ones when compared to the official measures (Figure 15 ).
<Figure 15 near here> Despite these differences between the official and the NAS measures, it remains the case that tax and transfer policies do a considerably better job of reducing poverty among older people than working-age ones. After accounting for taxes and transfers, poverty rose during the GR for the working age, and among some sub-groups it is has continued to rise 
Conclusions and discussion
This paper shows that tax and transfer policies blunted much of the increase in poverty and some of the rise income inequality that we would have otherwise experienced during the Great Recession. These anti-poverty policies, however, were most effective for older households and for families with children. When we focus on non-elderly households, working-age individuals, and workers, we see record levels of hourly wage inequality, sharp increases in poverty and no change in income inequality during the Great Recession.
As the economy has returned to a slow-growing recovery and economic stimulus measures been phased out, inequality has begun to rise again, and poverty rates for working- The elderly, owners of capital, and most high income households are doing well as we recover from the recession, and as capital markets have recovered faster than wages or jobs.
Middle and lower-income households -those relying on earnings to provide essentially all of their income, those whose primary asset is their home, and those with something less than an The extended period of high unemployment that continues despite the recovery also threatens to have long-term consequences. Sustained high rates of poverty, especially among young jobless adults and families, is likely permanently scarring the futures of millions of unemployed younger unskilled adults. Without explicit steps to improve employment prospects for these particular workers, and to support the incomes of their children as we come out of the recession, poverty can be expected to remain high among this group. 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 Household and Family poverty rates, US Official and 60% of median, Census 'money income ', 1979-2011 (indexed 1979 = 100) Source. Authors' analysis of March CPS (various years). Figure 16 excludes imputed rent to home ownerhip. NAS income includes a broader range of transfers than "Money Income," and also excludes taxes. (See Income Definitions Appendix for more details.) Poverty thresholds in Figure 16 reflect NAS recommendations, and include cost of living adjustment based on median household expenditures, geographic cost of living adjustments, and out-of-pocket medical expenses. 
to 2009
Note1: This is the Census defintion of market income less the imputed rent for home ownership. Census Market Income includes earnings (wages, salaries, and self-employment income), interest, dividends, rents, royalties, estate and trust income, nongovernment retirement, survivor, and disability pensions and annuities, realized capital gains (losses), non-government eduational assistance, child support, alimony, contributions, imputed return to home equity on owner-occupied housing, money income not elsewhere classified, deducting work-related expenses (excluding child care).
Note2: NAS income includes all of the components of "market" income (augmented by Social Security, Survivors and Veterans Benenfits, and Government Pensions and Annuities) PLUS unemployment compensation, worker's compensation, government disasbility pensions, public assistance (TANF), SSI, government education assistance, federal and state refundable earned income tax credits, food stamps (SNAP), free and reduced price lunches, low-income energy assistance, public housing and rental subsidies, regular price school lunches, economic stimulus payments (2009 and 2010) 
